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Abstract
We study the impact of electricity divestments in a stylised model where a dominant
producer faces a competitive fringe with the same cost structure and is forced to sell
some of its capacity. For a given demand level, the divestment which achieves the
greatest reduction in prices can be several times more e⁄ective in reducing prices than
a divestment of baseload (or low-cost) plants. We extend this theoretical result to the
case with variable electricity demand by considering a numerical example based on
data from the Italian market.
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11 Introduction
The divestment of capacity owned by producers with market power in electricity generation
markets is often employed as a remedy by competition authorities and sector regulators
to enhance competition. Plant divestments have been used across Europe recently, in the
context of merger control proceedings, abuse of dominance investigations, and regulatory
reviews of market power in electricity markets. Examples of electricity mergers where these
measures have been employed by the competition authorities include Gas Natural/Union
Fenosa (2009), EDF/British Energy (2008), Gas Natural/Endesa (2006) and GDF/Suez
(2006).1 Abuse of dominance cases where divestments have been implemented as a remedy
include the proceedings involving E.On in 2008, whilst divestments of generation capacity
were also implemented to mitigate market power of incumbent generators in the UK and
Italy in the 1990s.2
This paper considers the competitive impact of divestments in a stylised model of a
wholesale electricity market where a dominant producer faces a competitive fringe with the
same cost structure. We ￿rst review the impact of divestments on prices for a constant level
of electricity demand. We then extend the analytical results for constant demand to the case
with variable demand by relying on a numerical illustration based on data from the Italian
market.
As we establish in [4] and [5], the position of the divested capacity on the marginal cost
curve of the dominant ￿rm has a signi￿cant e⁄ect on the impact that a divestment has
on market prices. For su¢ ciently large divestments, the divestment policy which achieves
the greatest reduction in prices for a given demand level is the one which divests marginal
plants, whose range of marginal costs encompasses the post-divestment equilibrium price.
1Divestments of generation capacity were also implemented in the British market in the context of two
mergers involving the incumbent generators and retail suppliers during the 1990s.
2Virtual as opposed to physical divestments are also employed to reduce market power in generation
markets, through VPP auctions. Most of the existing literature on pro-competitive measures in electricity
markets examines forward contracts and VPPs, rather than divestments (see for example [1], [2], and [3]).
[4] compares the relative e⁄ectiveness of divestments and VPPs.
2A divestment of this type induces the dominant ￿rm to price on the ￿ atter segment of
its residual demand curve. Depending on the size of the divestment, the most e⁄ective
divestment can reduce prices several times more than the divestment of baseload plants.
The numerical example that we consider using data from the Italian electricity market
shows that if all demand levels in a given period (e.g. 1 year) are considered in the analysis,
then in order to maximise consumer welfare the divested capacity needs to have a marginal
cost that is below that of the optimal divestment at average demand. This ensures that the
divestment is capable of reducing prices for all demand levels, and not only for medium to
high demand. This result is however reversed if the divestment is chosen so as to reduce
prices for only high demand levels (when market power concerns might be greatest). In this
case the costs of the divestment lie above those of the optimal divestment at average demand
(for the demand levels considered).
The structure of the remainder of this paper is as follows: Section 2 describes the set-
up of our model, including a characterisation of the pre-divestment equilibrium; Section 3
reviews the analytical results which can be obtained for the case of intermediate divestments
and constant demand; Section 4 extends our results to the case with variable demand, using
a numerical illustration from the Italian market; and Section 5 concludes.
2 Summary of modelling framework
As we set out in [4] and [5], we model divestments in a stylised electricity market with a
dominant ￿rm facing a competitive fringe that o⁄ers all of its output at cost. We assume for
simplicity that pre-divestment the dominant ￿rm and the fringe have the same linear and
increasing marginal cost function, with slope ￿: We de￿ne marginal costs for each ￿rm i as
ci and output as qi. We also adopt subscript d for the dominant ￿rm and f for the fringe.
Our set-up implies that ci = ￿qi for i = d;f. We also assume that total demand is perfectly
price-inelastic and that consumers have a maximum willingness to pay which lies above the
3pre-divestment price. This ensures that consumer welfare is bounded. We initially assume
that demand takes a ￿xed value ￿, and later relax this assumption in Section 4 of the paper:
In the absence of divestments, for a given price p, the competitive fringe always produces
at its marginal cost: p = cf = ￿qf, where qf = ￿ ￿ qd, implying that the residual demand
function for the incumbent ￿rm is p = ￿(￿￿qd). Pro￿t maximisation by the dominant ￿rm
implies that it will set q￿
d =
￿
3; and p￿ = 2
3￿￿ where the latter de￿nes the pre-divestment
price level.
We employ this set-up to model divestments of contiguous generation units on the mar-
ginal cost function of the dominant ￿rm. The maximum output (or capacity) that can be
produced by the divested units is de￿ned as ￿. This parameter is exogenous in our model
and can be interpreted as the outcome of the interaction between a regulator that seeks to
mitigate market power and other groups which oppose such intervention. Alternatively, ￿
can be thought of as the smallest intervention required to eliminate the price increase that
is associated with a given competition concern (e.g. a merger or an abuse of dominance).
The marginal cost of the most expensive divested unit is de￿ned as c. This uniquely de￿nes
the ￿ position￿of the divestment on the cost curve of the dominant ￿rm.
Divested generation units are assigned to the competitive fringe through a competitive
auction process, and are thereafter o⁄ered to the market at cost in the post-divestment
equilibrium. Relative to the pre-divestment set-up, the marginal cost curve of the dominant
￿rm therefore shifts upwards for cd > c ￿ ￿￿ and its residual demand curve is lower for
p > c￿￿￿ . It is also ￿ atter than the pre-divestment residual demand function (i.e. it takes
slope
￿
2) for p 2 (c ￿ ￿￿;c).
3 Impact of divestments for a given demand level
In this paper we consider divestments of ￿intermediate￿ size, de￿ned as cases where ￿,
expressed as a ratio of total demand ￿ (i.e. ￿
￿), lies between 1￿ 12
5
p
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Figure 1: The post-divestment price function (for a given level of ￿).
This is a relative wide range for the divestment expressed as a percentage of total demand,
which captures most realistic scenarios. [4] extends the results presented in this paper to
smaller and larger divestments.
As it is found and derived in [4] a unique post-divestment price function can be obtained
on the basis of fairly straightforward calculations of the optimal price set by the dominant
￿rm, for a given level of demand ￿ and for divestments of intermediate size. This function
is denoted as p(c;￿) and is plotted in Figure 1.
As Figure 1 illustrates, this function lies below the pre-divestment price p￿ for divestments
that are su¢ ciently competitive, which is the case if c is not too high (i.e. c < p￿ + 3￿p,
where ￿p ￿
￿￿
3 ). The post-divestment price function contains six distinct segments (denoted
as I through to V I), depending on the value of the highest cost of the divested capacity
c. This function shifts upwards (downwards) for a higher (lower) demand level except in
segment V . In addition, the ranges of segments I to V increase with ￿, although they do
not increase in the same proportion.
53.1 Characterisation of the optimal divestment
The lowest post-divestment price is achieved at the lower end of Segment IV of the post-







(￿ ￿ ￿) ￿ 0:63￿ (￿ ￿ ￿). We
de￿ne a divestment of this type as the optimal divestment for a given level of demand, from
the perspective of consumer welfare. Such optimal divestment achieves the competitive price
at the upper end of the range for the size of the divestment that we consider (i.e. if ￿
￿ = 1￿
2 p
6), and it otherwise yields a price that is between the competitive price and p￿. Setting c =
^ c(￿) implies that the divested capacity is price-setting in the post-divestment equilibrium,
and that its costs encompass the post-divestment price (i.e. p(^ c(￿);￿) =
p
6
4 ￿ (￿ ￿ ￿) 2
[^ c(￿)￿￿￿;^ c(￿))). The optimal position for the divested capacity results in the lowest post-
divestment price because it induces the dominant ￿rm to drop its price in order to capture
more output from the competitive fringe, and to prevent some of the divested capacity from
producing.
3.2 Description of the entire post-divestment price function
The distinct segments in the post-divestment price function plotted in Figure 1 can be
understood by reference to the impact of a divestment on the cost and demand of the
dominant ￿rm. A divestment increases the cost function of the dominant ￿rm above a given
marginal cost level (i.e. for c > c￿￿￿). This can be de￿ned as a cost-increasing e⁄ect (which
tends to reduce the pro-competitive impact of a divestment, ceteris paribus). A divestment
also changes the residual demand curve of the dominant ￿rm, introducing a ￿ atter segment,
and also displacing it downwards by the size of the divestment ￿ for su¢ ciently high price
levels (i.e. p > c). We term the ￿rst demand e⁄ect a demand-slope e⁄ect, whilst the second
demand e⁄ect is termed a demand-shift e⁄ect.
There are three segments of the post-divestment price function where interior equilibria
exist and prices fall relative to the pre-divestment level: these are segments I, III, and IV .3
3Segments II and V of the post-divestment price function are corner solutions, which exist due to the jump
6These segments display di⁄erent combinations of the three possible cost and demand e⁄ects
described above:
￿ In segment I (which relates to divestment of low-cost, or baseload, units) the cost-
increasing and the demand-shift e⁄ects apply, leading to a price reduction since the
second e⁄ect outweighs the ￿rst.
￿ In segment III, the demand-shift e⁄ect applies, but not the cost-increasing one, since
the divested units are relatively expensive. The price reduction from the divestment
in this segment is larger than in range I (more precisely, it is twice as large) since the
cost-increasing e⁄ect is absent.
￿ In segment IV , the demand-slope e⁄ect applies instead of the demand-shift e⁄ect
since the cost of the divested units is su¢ ciently high so as to make it pro￿table for
the dominant ￿rm to price on the ￿ atter segment of its residual demand curve. This
has a pro-competitive output-expansion e⁄ect on the dominant ￿rm. The optimal
divestment is therefore located on this segment of the post-divestment price function.
Our results indicate that the optimal divestment can be several-fold more e⁄ective than
a baseload divestment (de￿ned as a divestment that yields a price in segment I of the post-
divestment price function). As it is established in [4], at the lower bound of the relevant
range of ￿
￿ (i.e. ￿
￿ = 1 ￿ 12
5
p
6), the optimal divestment is approximately 9.9 times more
e⁄ective than a baseload divestment; at the upper bound of the relevant range of ￿
￿ (i.e.
￿
￿ = 1 ￿ 2 p
6), this ratio drops to 2:7:
As for total welfare, a divestment can a⁄ect total costs (and therefore e¢ ciency in our
model) through three distinct e⁄ects: a reduction in the output of the high-cost capacity
owned by the fringe; an increase in the output of the divested capacity (if it was not being
fully utilised by the dominant ￿rm pre-divestment); and a change in the net output of the
in the post-divestment cost function of the dominant ￿rm, and one of the two kinks in its post-divestment
residual demand function. In segment V I the divestment has no e⁄ect, because the marginal costs of the
divested units are too high to constrain the pricing of the dominant ￿rm.
7dominant ￿rm (de￿ned as output net of any part of the divested capacity that the dominant
￿rm was using pre-divestment). Due to the assumption of increasing marginal costs, a
divestment increases production e¢ ciency as long as it does not induce the dominant ￿rm to
reduce its net output. [4] shows that this condition implies that a divestment of intermediate
size increases production e¢ ciency for all the ranges of c (including the optimal level ^ c(￿)) up
to (and including) segment V , with the only exception of segment III, where a divestment
can reduce e¢ ciency if it is su¢ ciently small and expensive.
4 The case with variable electricity demand: an illus-
tration using Italian data
In this section we extend the theoretical results summarised so far to the case with multiple
levels of electricity demand ￿, and a unique divestment policy (de￿ned as above by the
choice of the parameter ￿ c). We use actual demand data from the Italian market in 2007 to
identify the optimal divestment policy in the case where the policy maker can only choose one
divestment package for multiple demand levels, which is realistic for the electricity market
given the signi￿cant demand variability that is observed within and across days.
The purpose of this numerical illustration is not to simulate the price e⁄ect which would
actually result if one were to implement a divestment from the largest operator (ENEL)
in Italy, since the stylised model of the electricity market described above cannot fully
capture the complexities of the Italian market (both in terms of the cost structure of market
participants, and of the nature of their market power). The intention of the example is
instead to illustrate the type of issues that can arise when a regulator or a competition
authority needs to identify a single divestment package capable of reducing market power
across multiple demand levels, using actual demand on demand variability from a speci￿c
electricity market.
We use this example to compute the optimal position of a divestment of a given size
8across di⁄erent demand levels, where the optimal divestment is here de￿ned as the one
that minimises total consumer expenditure (i.e. it maximises consumer welfare given our
assumption of inelastic demand). We compare this numerically-computed optimum with the
prices obtained with the optimal divestment at average demand and a baseload divestment
(whose positions can be obtained analytically using the results summarised above).
In this numerical illustration we use data on 288 demand levels. These correspond to
hourly demand on 12 typical week-days in Italy in 2007, de￿ned as the third Wednesday of
each month.4 We only consider net demand met by domestic production in our de￿nition of
demand (i.e. we exclude imports from demand) since this measure provides a slightly better
￿t of the data to our stylised model of price formation. Over these twelve days, average net
demand equalled 37:2GW, with a minimum value of 23:7GW, and a maximum of 53:4GW.
The corresponding level for a divestment of intermediate size across all demand levels is
therefore in the range of 1:1GW and 4:3GW (with the lower value given by multiplying
the highest demand level by 1 ￿ 12
5
p
6, and the higher value given by multiplying the lowest
demand level by 1 ￿ 2 p
6). For the purposes of the simulation we select a value of ￿ equal to
3GW.5
In order to illustrate the impact of di⁄erent divestments we also need to select a value
for the cost parameter ￿:We select a value that is based on the actual national spot price
levels observed in Italy in the 288 hours corresponding to our demand data. Assuming that
prices are a linear function of net demand (i.e. p = ￿￿), we obtain an estimate of ^ ￿ = 2:27
(expressing demand in GWh, and prices in e=MWh). Given that in our model p = 2
3￿￿;
this implies a value of ￿ = 3
2^ ￿ = 3:41.
Finally, we de￿ne a variable ￿ which equals the ￿duration￿of the hourly demand data
considered in each simulation.6 Setting ￿ = 100% implies that the divestment is selected
4This data is made available by the Italian transmission system operator Terna.
5Setting ￿ = 3GW implies at minimum demand (￿ = 23:7GW ) we have that ￿
￿ = 0:13, and that at
maximum demand (￿ = 53:4GW ) we have that ￿
￿ = 0:06. Both of these values are within the range of
intermediate divestments de￿ned above.
6When describing hourly load or price data, duration levels indicate the percentage of hours within a
given period during which load or prices are above a given level.
9so as to minimise consumer expenditure across all hours. Selecting lower values of ￿ mean
that we only consider the top ￿ of demand levels. This is a one-sided truncation of the
demand distribution which allows us to study the optimal divestment for high demand levels
only. Electricity markets are typically more competitive for low demand levels than for
high demand levels, which can justify focusing market power mitigation e⁄orts primarily
on periods with high demand.7 Setting ￿ < 100% allows us to study the market power
mitigation problem only for peak (or high) demand hours.
For given levels of ￿ and ￿ we compute analytically the prices obtained with a baseload
divestment and with an optimal divestment at average demand. The latter is given by







(E (￿ j ￿) ￿ ￿), where E (￿ j ￿) is the expected level
of demand for a given level of ￿ (e.g. E (￿ j ￿) = 37:2GW for ￿ = 100%).
We then numerically compute the position of the optimal divestment across all the de-
mand levels considered in each simulation. As described above this is the value of c which
minimises consumer expenditure, which is in turn equivalent to minimising demand-weighted
average prices. We de￿ne this position for the divestment as c￿, which is given by the fol-
lowing expression:
c










where Int denotes a function that rounds down a number to the nearest integer; P (c;￿)
denotes the demand-weighted average price across all demand realisations in a given sim-
ulation, for pre-speci￿ed values of c and of ￿; and ￿t denotes the hourly demand level at
7In our model this feature could be captured by assuming that there are operational constraints on
withholding by the dominant ￿rm during o⁄-peak hours, and/or that cost function of the competitive fringe
is ￿ atter for baseload production and steeper (i.e. it has slope equals ￿) for peak load hours. The latter
assumption would not change the results presented in this paper, as long as the cost level at which the
cost function of the fringe becomes steeper is su¢ ciently low relative to the demand conditions which are
modelled.
10position t in the distribution of the 288 demand observations contained in our data, ranked
from lowest demand (t = 1) to highest demand (t = T = 288).
Our simulation results are reported in Table [1] and Table [2]. Table [1] reports the
simulated post-divestment demand-weighted average prices for ￿ = 3GW and for three
di⁄erent values of ￿ (100%, 50% and 20%). The table shows these results for three di⁄erent
types of divestments: the numerically-computed optimal divestment; the optimal divestment
at average demand conditions (for a given ￿); and a baseload divestment (de￿ned as the
highest-cost baseload divestment, for a given ￿). This table also reports the highest and
lowest variable cost associated with each of the three types of divestment and the demand-
weighted average pre-divestment price (for each level of ￿). Table [2] reports the levels of
total consumer expenditure, costs and pro￿ts in each of the cases that we simulate. The
results on total costs describe the performance of each type of divestment in terms of total
welfare (since costs and welfare are perfectly inversely correlated in our set-up).
4.1 Simulation results for all demand levels (￿ = 100%)
Our results show that the position of the numerically-computed optimal divestment lies
below the optimal divestment at average demand if all demand levels in our sample are
considered. In this case the highest cost of the optimal divestment equals 61:9e=MWh,
whilst the position of the optimal divestment for average demand equals 73:8e=MWh, as
reported in Table [1].8 The relative gain in consumer welfare from departing from the
optimum divestment at average demand is however not large, as both the results in Table
[1] and Table [2] indicate.
Our results are also illustrated in Figure [2], which plots the price duration curves corre-
sponding to the pre- and post-divestment equilibria.9 Two post-divestment duration curves
8The position of the numerically-computed optimal divestment corresponds to levels of ^ c(￿) which apply
to signi￿cantly lower levels than average demand. In the example that we consider, the duration of the
demand level at which the computed optimal divestment equals ^ c(￿) is of roughly 70% (i.e. 70% of hours
have demand above this level).
9Price duration curves plot hourly prices in descending order, with the duration level indicating the
11are shown: one corresponding to the numerically computed optimal divestment; and one for
the optimal divestment at average demand. The shape of the price duration curve corre-
sponding to the numerically computed optimal divestment is driven by the fact that for low
demand levels (i.e. for durations above approximately 70%), prices are given in segments IV
and V of the post-divestment price function. For other demand levels (i.e. for durations be-
low approximately 70% in this case), prices are given in segment III of the post-divestment
price function.
By contrast, if the optimal divestment at average demand is selected instead, lower prices
are obtained for durations between roughly 55% and 70%, but higher prices are achieved for
durations above 70%. No reduction in prices is achieved by this alternative divestment for
durations in excess of roughly 85%, due to the fact that the cost of the divested capacity is too
high to impose a competitive constraint for low demand levels (i.e. prices are set in segment
V I of the corresponding post-divestment price function).10 The gain in consumer welfare
achieved at low demand levels outweighs the loss for intermediate demand levels, implying
that the position of the optimal divestment lies below that of the optimal divestment at
average demand.11
Both the numerically-computed optimal divestment and the optimal divestment at av-
erage demand signi￿cantly outperform the baseload divestment, as should be expected on
the basis of our analytical results. In our example the baseload divestment reduces demand-
weighted prices by almost 4% (from 87:8e=MWh to 84:4e=MWh), whilst the optimal di-
vestment achieves a reduction of 8% (from 87:8e=MWh to 80:8e=MWh), which is more
percentage of hours when prices are above a given price level. E.g. 0% duration corresponds to the highest
price hour (i.e. no hours have a price greater than this level), and 100% duration corresponds to the lowest
price hour (i.e. 100% of hours have a price greater than or equal to this level).
10At very high demand levels (i.e. duration less than 5%), the optimal divestment at average demand
reduces prices by more than the computed optimum, but this e⁄ect is relatively limited.
11This result follows in turn from the fact that range III of the post-divestment price function (i.e. the
values of ￿ c for which this segment applies) is larger than those of ranges IV and V for low levels of ￿
￿. This
means that even for relatively low values of ￿ c prices will be determined in segment III when demand is high
(i.e. ￿
￿ is low), thus still resulting in a price reduction from the divestment at high demand. By contrast,
if a higher value of ￿ c is chosen, at low demand levels the divestment will be ine⁄ective (i.e. segment V I
will apply). In order to increase the number of hours in which the divestment is able to reduce prices, it is
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Figure 2: Price duration curves (for ￿ = 3GW and ￿ = 100%).
than twice as much.12 The optimal divestment outperforms both the baseload divestment
and the optimal divestment at average demand also in terms of welfare, since it reduces total
costs relative to the pre-divestment level by more than the other two divestment types (see
results in Table [2]).13
Overall this numerical example suggests that whilst consumers may bene￿t from selecting
a divestment whose costs are lower than the optimal divestment for average demand, the
consumer gain from doing so might be small, and in any event the costs of the divested
capacity should still be set well above those corresponding to baseload generation.
4.2 Simulation results for high demand levels only (￿ < 100%)
The result obtained above on the relative position of the optimal divestment with variable
demand depends on the actual distribution of demand during those hours in which market
power is a concern. If the divestment intends to reduce prices in a relatively limited number
of peak hours (for the reasons set out above), the result is likely to be reversed, ceteris
12Note that the percentage reduction in demand-weighted average prices also measures the percentage
reduction in consumer expenditure, by de￿nition.
13Further simulations results (which we do not report) show that the three values of ￿ considered in this
paper the optimal divestment from the perspective of consumer welfare is also very close to being optimal
in terms of total welfare.
13paribus. This follows from the shape of the post-divestment price function. In particular,
the presence of a downwards jump in prices between segments III and IV of the function
implies that if the range of the demand levels which are considered is narrower, then it is
optimal to select a position for the optimal divestment that is above the one corresponding
to average demand. This ensures that segment IV of the post-divestment price function
applies to a higher number of demand realisations.
This result is illustrated by our numerical simulation, when considering values of ￿ that
are lower than 100%. The results included in Table [1] show that for both ￿ = 50% and
￿ = 20% the costs of the optimal divestment lie above those of the divestment which is
optimal at the corresponding average demand conditions. This is particularly the case if
one looks at peak hours only (i.e. ￿ = 20%). In this case, the highest cost of the optimal
divestment equals 101:0e=MWh, whilst the position of the optimal divestment at average
demand equals 95:2e=MWh. On the other hand, for ￿ = 50% the costs of the two types of
divestments are similar.
In the two cases that we consider for ￿ < 100%, the optimal divestment is also relatively
more e⁄ective in reducing prices than the baseload divestment (relative to the benchmark
with ￿ = 100%). For example, for ￿ = 20% the optimal divestment reduces demand-
weighted average prices by 11% (from 107:3e=MWh to 95:2e=MWh) whilst a baseload
divestment leads to a 3% price reduction (from 107:3e=MWh to 103:9e=MWh). For both
values of ￿, the relative consumer gain from selecting the optimal divestment rather than
the optimal divestment at average demand is fairly limited (and well above the gain relative
to the baseload divestment).
As Table [2] shows, also in these two cases the optimal divestment from the point of
view of consumer welfare achieves the best outcome in terms of e¢ ciency (i.e. total costs),
relative both to the other two divestment types that we consider, and to the pre-divestment
benchmark.
145 Conclusion
This paper has studied the impact on spot market prices of transfers of generation capacity
from a dominant producer to a competitive fringe. Analytical results that we have developed
in earlier work show that divesting capacity that is marginal (or price-setting) in the post-
divestment equilibrium can be several-fold more e⁄ective in reducing prices that an equivalent
release of baseload capacity. These results hold for a given level of demand.
In this paper we extend the analytical results to the case of variable demand by consid-
ering a numerical example constructed using data from the Italian electricity market. The
purpose of the numerical simulation is to establish the nature of the optimal intervention
when demand levels are variable and a single divestment package needs to be chosen (both
of which are realistic conditions in electricity markets).
The numerical illustration presented in this paper shows that when all demand levels in
a given period are considered to select the optimal divestment, the divestment that is most
e⁄ective in reducing prices has a position in the merit order that is below the one associated
with the optimal divestment at average demand (i.e. it is less ￿ strategic￿than the optimum
at average demand). This result is due to the fact that the optimal divestment at average
demand is relatively ine⁄ective for low demand levels, and achieves no reduction in prices for
particularly low demand (since the costs of the divested capacity are too high at low demand).
This result is however reversed if only high demand conditions are taken into account when
selecting the optimal divestment, which can be the case if the divestment intends to mitigate
market power only during peak hours. In this case our simulation indicates that the cost
of the optimal divestment lies above the level associated with average peak demand. In
all the cases that we consider the optimal divestment from the point of view of consumer
welfare is also e¢ ciency-enhancing, and it delivers a signi￿cantly larger reduction in consumer
expenditure relative to a baseload divestment.
156 List of symbols
￿ : slope of the marginal cost function
ci : marginal cost for ￿rm i
qi : output for ￿rm i
d : subscript for the dominant ￿rm
f : subscript for the competitive fringe
￿ : demand value
￿t :demand value at position t in the distribution of demand (ranked from lowest to
highest)
p : price
p￿ : pre-divestment price level
P(c;￿) : demand-weighted average post-divestment price
￿ : maximum output that can be produced by the divested units
c : marginal cost of the most expensive divested unit
c￿(￿) :optimal divestment for multiple demand realisations




^ ￿ : estimate of the slope of the assumed price-quantity function
￿ : duration of the hourly demand data considered in each simulation
MWh : Megawatt hours
GW : Gigawatt
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17Table 1: Simulation results for ￿ = 3GW and di⁄erent values of ￿: pre- and post-divestment
prices, and costs of the divested capacity. Values are expressed in e/MWh.
￿ = 100% ￿ = 50% ￿ = 20%
c c P(c, ￿) c c P(c, ￿) c c P(c, ￿)
Optimal divestment 51:7 61:9 80:8 79:0 89:2 89:7 90:7 101:0 95:2
Optimal divestment at
average demand 63:6 73:8 81:4 77:0 87:2 89:9 85:0 95:2 97:2
Baseload divestment 20:1 30:3 84:4 36:7 46:9 95:9 42:8 53:1 103:9
Demand-weighted average
pre-divestment price 87:8 99:3 107:3
Table 2: Simulation results for ￿ = 3GW and di⁄erent values of ￿: consumer expenditure
(E), total costs (C) and total pro￿ts (￿). Values are expressed in e million.
￿ = 100% ￿ = 50% ￿ = 20%
E C ￿ E C ￿ E C ￿
Optimal divestment 866 378 488 561 249 312 261 116 145
Optimal divestment at
average demand 872 383 489 562 251 312 266 119 147
Baseload divestment 905 381 524 600 252 348 284 119 165
Pre-divestment 941 392 549 621 259 363 293 122 171
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